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Abstract 
Concepts of social enterprise have been debated repeatedly, and continue to 
cause confusion.  In this paper, a meta-theoretical framework is developed 
through discussion of individualist and communitarian philosophy.  
Philosophers from both traditions build social theories that emphasise either 
consensus (a unitarist outlook) or diversity (a pluralist outlook).  The various 
discourses in corporate governance reflect these assumptions and create four 
distinct approaches that impact on the relationship between capital and 
labour.  In rejecting the traditional discourse of private enterprise, social 
enterprises have adopted other approaches to tackle social exclusion, each 
derived from different underlying beliefs about the purpose of enterprise and 
the nature of governance.  The theoretical framework offers a way to 
understand the diversity found within the sector, including the newly 
constituted Community Interest Company (CIC). 
 
Dr Rory Ridley-Duff is a writer/consultant/lecturer whose doctoral research 
establishes how friendship, courtship and parental interests shape 
entrepreneurship and systems of governance.  His research into social 
enterprise evolved out of directorships in two employee-controlled businesses 
combined with 15 years of consultancy work in the social economy.  For his 
doctoral research, he undertook a critical ethnography while assisting a 
private company to become an employee-owned business.  He has also 
worked with social entrepreneurs on the start up of charitable and trading 
organisations. 
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Introduction 
Social enterprise is being touted as the economic engine of the future 
(Harding, 2004) as well as a conceptual model for social responsibility 
(Francesco, 2005).  As the movement increases its international appeal and 
credentials (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Spear and Bidet, 2005; Vidal, 
2005) debate persists regarding the boundary of the social enterprise sector 
and the nature of social entrepreneurship (Borzaga and Santuari, 2003; Dees 
and Anderson, 2003; Harding, 2004).  In the UK, government and policy unit 
calls for asset-locks and a “not-for-profit” orientation (DTI, 2002, 2003; Haugh, 
2005) are contrasted by entrepreneurial interest in surplus sharing and a 
“more-than-profit” orientation (Brown, 2004; Ridley-Duff, 2004; Allen, 2005)1.  
While the former is preoccupied with retention of surpluses within the 
enterprise, the latter argue for the distribution of surpluses to all stakeholders 
in order to create sustainable social and economic democracy. 
In section 1, I outline individualist and communitarian social theories that have 
influenced ideas about governance.  In individualist theory, people are 
conceptualised as autonomous and rational, capable of developing their 
cognitive abilities to achieve intellectual freedom.  Communitarian philosophy 
offers an alternative way to understand people, as embedded within - and 
penetrated by - an array of cultural assumptions and knowledge.  Both 
individualist and communitarian theory, however, contain advocates who take 
a unitarist (consensus) or pluralist (diversity) outlook.  Out of these 
differences, a meta-theory is constructed that explains the diversity of 
approaches.   
In section 2, I examine the heritage and evolution of corporate governance 
discourses to reveal how arguments regarding the role of ownership and 
control are constructed.  In section 3, these are examined in light of the 
ongoing debate about the definition and purpose of social enterprise, 
particularly the newly constituted Community Interest Company (CIC) form.  
In reviewing current studies, I contend that enduring impacts are most likely 
when organisations with a communitarian outlook adopt a pluralist approach 
to social organisation. 
1. Philosophies of Social Organisation 
Individualist philosophy regards truth as a private thought process where 
people separate themselves from the world and think rationally about it.  As 
autonomous individuals, decisions are - or should be - based on rational 
self-interest, while the application of rationality leads to “absolute” or 
“universal” truths.   
From this stance philosophers have suggested quite different types of ideal 
society.  Hobbes (1948) argues that individual self-interest leads to conflict 
and a “state of war” as part of his justification for sovereign powers that 
impose order and control.  Smith (1776), on the other hand, regards the 
pursuit of self-interest as something that contributes to a common good – an 
“invisible hand” where equilibrium between producers and suppliers brings 
about the most good for the most people.  The resulting society – in which he 
envisaged free-traders in abundance – distributes economic power widely 
and provides a blue-print for social organisation in public and private 
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organisations that observe a framework of universal rights (Friedman, 1962; 
Rawls, 1999, 2001) 
Philosophers from the empiricist tradition, while accepting an individualist 
orientation, disagree that ‘pure’ thought is possible.  Hume, for example, 
departed from the notion that the individual is capable of ‘pure’ reason (Hume, 
1749), and argued that reason was a product of interacting with the world.  
Throughout the twentieth century, various philosophers have argued that we 
evolve through constant interaction with other people and our physical 
environment (Giddens, 1984; Cladis, 1992; Gaus, 2003). 
Communitarian philosophy has consolidated the position that rights and 
freedoms are cultural constructs and have specific meanings to members of a 
particular society (or organisation).  In contrast to individualist thought, 
communitarians focus less on the development of individual rights and the 
pursuit of self-interest and more on utilitarian arguments that “shared values” 
can be developed to achieve a “common good”. 
The logical development of this argument is that personal identity is socially 
constructed and that ‘best practice’ is a cultural rather than an absolute 
standard.  Following Durkheim, Giddens (1984, 1990) contends that we 
recursively evolve our social structures.  Rawls’ principles are reinterpreted as 
the outcome of a political process.  They are also bound to, and reflect, the 
dominant ideas at a particular point in time.  As such, universal rights are not 
possible, even if they endure in a particular culture for a period of time. 
Communitarian philosophy, however, is divided in its attitude to the 
benevolence of strong cultures and normative values.  There has been 
repeated debate over whether social engineering brings about emancipation 
(Mayo, 1933; Ouchi, 1981; Peters & Waterman, 1982) or paves the way for 
totalitarian control and oppression (Whyte, 1956; Lukes, 1974; Kunda, 1992; 
Kasmir, 1996; Thompson and Findlay, 1999).   
Collins (1997) and Tam (1999) responded by attempting to create a “liberal” 
communitarianism at the juncture between conservative and liberal thinking.  
Both, however, limit their calls to various forms of representative democracy 
and legal reform so that recalcitrant business leaders are prodded into 
practising equality.  Democratic forums, they contend, will “prove” democracy 
as a superior way of organising, something that others have argued is an 
alternative form of authoritarianism through the dictatorship of the majority (for 
both arguments see Lutz, 1997, 2000; Skoble, 1994). 
There is, however, another communitarian tradition.  At the International in 
1872, anarchists frustrated at the class and state control arguments of 
Marxists left the coalition to advocate pluralist forms of organisation that did 
not rely on the state.  Their work was forgotten after Schumpeter’s treatise on 
democratic organisation, but their views survived through the cooperative 
movement’s attachment to collective organisation and community-based 
control (see Schumpeter, 1942; Rothschild and Allen-Whitt, 1986). 
The argument here is that sustainable social organisation evolves out of 
equitable relationships (Ward, 1966), with accidental innovation and 
experimentation playing a significant role.  Careful studies of enduring 
companies that are “build to last” (Collins and Porras, 2000) or which make 
the transition from “good-to-great” (Collins, 2001) support the view that social 
capital (Coleman, 1988; Evers, 2001) is important to sustainable businesses 
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regardless of the economic sector in which they develop or the philosophy 
that drives their development.  Sustainable companies (and economies) are 
built slowly by groups of people who collaborate over many years and not 
through the deliberate agency of visionary leaders or charismatic 
entrepreneurs.  Collins (2001) substantive study of the 11 most improved 
companies on the US stock exchange found a negative correlation between 
charismatic leaders and sustainability. 
There are four philosophical standpoints that embody different ideals in 
governance.  In practice, organisation leaders will adopt positions along a 
continuum and may evolve their approach over time or take different 
approaches in different contexts.  In periods of instability, they may even 
switch approaches to meet environmental challenges.  The four ideals, 
however, can be summarised as shown in Table 1: 
Table 1 - A Meta-Theoretical View of Organisation Governance 
 
 Unitarism Pluralism 
 
 
 
Individualism  
Governance by a sovereign who 
imposes their values to provide 
an equitable system of 
governance.  Rules are created 
to impose social order, allocate 
responsibilities and adjudicate 
conflicts between subjects. 
Governance that accommodates 
conflict through individual rights 
and discursive democracy.  
Balance is achieved through 
democratic control (in social life) 
and market mechanisms (in 
economic life). 
 
Communitarianism 
Governance by an elite able to 
create consensus.  Rules reflect 
the shared values of a political 
elite who allocate responsibilities 
and adjudicate disputes 
according to their perception of 
collective interests.  Elites 
marginalise minority points of 
views. 
Governance that accommodates 
conflict through discursive 
democracy to determine political 
rights and responsibilities of 
individuals within collective 
structures.  Balance is achieved 
in both social and economic life 
through a mixture of participatory 
and representative democracy. 
In the next section, I examine the dominant discourses in business and 
contrast this with emergent pluralist alternatives.  In section 3, the impact on 
contemporary debates about the purpose and nature of social enterprise is 
discussed. 
2. Corporate Governance 
Each outlook applies a different body of knowledge.  Not only do each adopt 
different conceptions of the “governed”, they also adopt different criteria for 
measuring their effectiveness and efficiency (see Berry, Broadbent and Otley, 
1995).  Long standing support for entrepreneurial cultures in Anglo-American 
countries is reflected in contemporary guidelines on corporate governance 
(see Cadbury, 1992; FSA, 1998, 2003; ICAEW, 1999; IFAC, 2003; Monks 
and Minow, 2004).  The discourse assumes it is desirable to have a 
distinction between governors (shareholders, directors and senior managers) 
and the governed (supervisors / technical / manual workers).   
Identity is social 
Identity is individual 
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Despite a focus on the long-running tension between capital and labour, a 
much quieter (but no less significant) debate has been growing amongst 
those who question whether such divisions are inevitable.  Some of these 
arguments emerge in debates about the nature of social enterprise, a term 
whose definition remains as vague as private enterprise, but which embodies 
the notion that trading activity can bring about progressive social change by 
addressing issues of social exclusion.  One popular definition is promoted by 
the Social Enterprise Coalition: 
A social enterprise is not defined by its legal status but by its nature: its social 
aims and outcomes; the basis on which its social mission is embedded in its 
structure and governance; and the way it uses the profits it generates through 
trading activities. 
(NEF / SAS2, 2004:8) 
While this definition is helpful, it does not make links between philosophical 
belief and different approaches to enterprise.  Let me, therefore, outline the 
dominant discourse in business and contrast it with emergent alternatives. 
The Dominant Discourse 
Monks and Minow (2004:8-9) review a wide range of definitions from 
Eisenberg’s view of the corporation as an “instrument through which capital is 
assembled…[for the] gain of the corporation’s owners, that is, the 
shareholders”, through to Bierce’s view of the corporation as “an ingenious 
device for obtaining individual profit without individual responsibility”!  Their 
own definition is that corporate governance is: 
…a mechanism established to allow different parties to contribute capital, 
expertise, and labor, for the maximum benefit of all of them.  The investor 
gets the chance to participate in profits of the enterprise without taking 
responsibility for operations.  The management gets the chance to run the 
company without taking responsibility of personally providing the funds. 
Although Monks and Minow acknowledge “labor” in their definition, their text 
reads as if “management” is the only type of labour within the scope of 
analysis.  Little regard is given to the labour of employees below management 
level, or the role of customers and suppliers in governance.  While ‘best 
practice’ requires audit committees to make provision for whistleblowing 
(Smith, 2003) employees have only limited protection under the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998.  The risks to both corporation from making 
provision, and to employees from exercising their right to whistleblow, 
continues to generate debate about its effectiveness (see Vinten, 1994; 
Lewis, 2001) 
Other theorists see the purpose of business differently (see Mayer, 1997; 
Patterson, 2001).  Coad and Cullen (2001, 2004) explore the sharp contrast 
between the narrow scope of discussion in the Cadbury, Hampel and Turnbull 
reports with an evolutionary view of economics.  This regards economic 
activity as an accidental and institutional activity, only sometimes driven by 
rationality.  It springs from habits of mind and thought (in the form of cultural 
norms, rituals and institutionalised behaviours) retained because of their past 
ability to sustain a community.  The primacy of shareholder interest is recast 
as a habit of thought (rather than a rational choice) perpetuated through 
mimetic processes. 
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The recent evolution of the (UK) Combined Code has increased the scope of 
discussion from financial management (Cadbury) to directors remuneration 
(Greenbury) to principles of good governance (Hampel), before widening the 
issues further to consider systems of internal control (Turnbull), institutional 
shareholders (Myners), auditors (Smith) and non-executive directors (Higgs).  
Taken as a whole, however, the Combined Code is still inwards looking, 
seeing directors as an island within the broader enterprise, empowered to 
review each others’ performance, subject only to external control from 
shareholders or regulators (see FSA, 2003). 
In the literature on social enterprise, Wallace (2005) outlines how the 
dominant discourse has affected government policy, but stands at odds with 
the aspirations and views of social entrepreneurs.  Policy in the UK, therefore, 
is oriented toward market solutions, trading income and celebration of the 
visionary entrepreneur, rather than mixed-mode approaches to funding and 
collaborative approaches in governance.  The consultation on the Community 
Interest Company (CIC) included discussion of democratic social relations 
(DTI, 2003), but the final legislation takes the default position that directors 
should be accountable primarily to the regulator and limits accountability to 
both shareholders and stakeholders. 
Previous debates on the viability and efficacy of stakeholder control, as well 
as European examples integrating stakeholder perspectives into corporate 
governance (Turnbull, 1995; Vinten, 2001; Wieland, 2005), have not yet 
shifted thinking in the UK away from the primacy of investor control and 
enlightened shareholder value (Friedman, 1962; Sternberg, 1998; DTI, 2005). 
This reinforces the prevailing view that a dominant group have an automatic 
right to involvement in governance (entrepreneurs, regulators and funders), 
and also that governance is about performance and conformance rather than 
developing a balanced set of relationships that will sustain a community 
(IFAC, 2003).  In addition to this, there is a political argument that business 
should not be political because it is only a financial and economic activity.  
This argument, which I will contest later, is that moral and political 
considerations are for politicians, not businesses, and that if a company is 
financially successful then all stakeholders will benefit. 
Since the 1980s, there have been managerial discourses that embrace 
collaboration rather than authority.  Johnson (2006) tracks the arguments for 
an end to top-down authority relations.  Each represents an incremental shift 
away from individualist perspectives.  Nevertheless, the unitarist framework 
remains – even when accompanied by democratic rhetoric – resulting in 
presumptions that a meritocracy, headed by an elite, are still entitled to set 
the rules regarding who can, and cannot, participate in decisions (see 
Michels, 1961; Collins, 2001; Parker, 2002).   
Critics of meritocracy point to the persistent research finding that oligarchies 
develop and become oppressive.  Anthropological studies suggest they 
undermine individuals capacity to act in morally responsible ways.  Fearful of 
rejection or exclusion, organisation members refrain from voicing legitimate 
concerns and are reluctant to exercise moral judgement in their daily work.  
As a result emotional withdrawal, hidden conflict, silent sabotage, depression 
and despair all contribute to deterioration across a social network, 
organisation or society (see Whyte, 1956; Kunda, 1992; Kotter and Heskett, 
1992; Willmott, 1993; Griseri, 1998; Thompson and Findlay, 1999; Ridley-
Duff, 2005). 
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The Beginnings of Pluralism 
The emergence of a social enterprise sector can be viewed as the outcome of 
a long historical process, a movement that embraces human endeavour as 
social, as well as rational, in its nature.  Humans are seen as capable of 
developing enterprises that are socio-economic in their commitments, and 
which can be governed by Habermasian principles that guarantee 
participation in opinion forming and decision-making (Tonnies, 1952; 
Habermas, 1974; Etzioni, 1988; Laville and Nyssens, 2001). 
Consideration of a fundamentally different relationship between capital and 
labour can be traced back over two centuries.  Gates (1998) found profit 
sharing arrangements between workers and owners as far back as 1795, but 
the first coherent critique of capitalist relations of production, and the 
articulation of an alternative gathered pace in the 1820s and 30s through the 
activities of Robert Owen and his followers.  Owen abhorred the “atomisation” 
that developed in his factories, and was also a critic of changes to the family 
brought about by industrialisation that separated women and men in daily life. 
Owen argued for a co-operative ethic based on community ownership of 
property.  The inherent ambiguity in this statement created disagreement 
amongst Owen’s followers over the boundary of the “community” and also 
whether common ownership should extend beyond the workplace into the 
private sphere.   
In contrast to the dominant discourse, the principle-agent relationship (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) is altered from one between shareholders and directors, 
to one between managers and workers (in producer co-ops), managers and 
suppliers (agricultural or marketing co-ops) or managers and customers (in 
consumer co-operatives).   Owen’s ideas have been enduring through an 
altered attitude to entrepreneurship that is rooted in collective action rather 
than individual vision and hierarchical control (see Harrison, 1969; Marx, 
1984). 
Co-operatives, however, have been repeatedly criticised for their limited 
ability to generate an entrepreneurial culture (Cornforth, 1988), inability to 
sustain inward investment (Vanek, 1977; Major, 1996, 1998; Major and Boby, 
2000) and a limited ability and/or desire to grow (Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; 
Ridley-Duff, 2002).  Cornforth, among others, argues that it is not the 
co-operative per se that is at fault, but the co-operative that isolates itself from 
conventional financial instruments (i.e. asset-locked organisations that do not 
allow members to purchase equity shares).  Even so, the co-operative as a 
political project in the UK was tainted in political circles after failed attempts 
by Labour government minister, Tony Benn, to convert three insolvent 
companies into co-operatives during the 1970s (see Oakeshott, 1990; Whyte 
and Whyte, 1991; Turnbull, 1994; Cheney, 1999). 
The Logic of Pluralism 
In Spain and Northern Italy some local economies are now dominated by 
co-operative companies, retailers, schools and universities (see Oakeshott, 
1990; Holmstrom, 1993; Francesco, 2005).  The MCC, in Mondragon (Spain), 
provides an example of sustained economic and social development based 
on co-operative principles (Cheney, 1999).  One of the most interesting 
departures is the rejection of the employer/employee relationship3 (see 
Ellerman, 1990) and a system of governance that distributes power to 
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separate bodies representing worker, manager and owner interests (see 
Turnbull, 1994; Ridley-Duff, 2004).  The US/UK employee share ownership 
plans (ESOPs) also establish a pluralist model of individual ownership (see 
Gates 1998; Major and Boby 2000) where the legitimacy of worker ownership 
is accepted alongside existing arrangements for external investors. 
In Europe, particularly in countries like France, Italy and Spain, where 
Co-operative Law has removed ambiguities in members’ governance and 
employment rights, there have been periods of strong growth (Oakeshott, 
1990; Holmstrom, 1993; Borzaga and Defourny, 2001).  In the UK, however, 
co-operative members are still governed by several bodies of law, escalating 
the cost of due diligence and employment disputes (Ridley-Duff, 2002).  
Neither the recent introduction of the CIC, or proposed revisions to Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act (IPS), resolves these issues.  As a result, the 
sector remains smaller than its continental and North American counterparts 
(Spear, 2001). 
Taken together, however, the drive to accommodate more stakeholders offers 
new models based on the principle of pluralism within the organisation, not 
simply through product and financial markets.  Others have adapted ideas 
from Mondragon to suit different regional and national frameworks (Gates, 
1998; Cheney, 1999) that acknowledge the interests of investors, managers 
and workers through different relationships to the enterprise, but a common 
interest in creating organisations that generate and distribute financial 
surpluses. 
The dual pressure to accommodate investors into co-operative corporate 
governance and employees into private ownership has resulted in an 
explosion of ownership and control models that operate on pluralist lines.  
SCEDU 4 adopted a model called NewCo, in which up to four stakeholder 
groups are recognised5 (entrepreneurs, employees, corporate supporters and 
investors).  Social Firms UK recommends a similar pluralist model that mixes 
variable yield equity for founder members and employees with preference 
shares for institutional investors6. 
Even the strongholds of Owenite common ownership (ICOM7 and 
Cooperative Group) responded by introducing a governance framework to 
accommodate multiple-stakeholders.  ICOM’s Blue 3 rules, introduced in 
1997, allowed for two classes of share, “profit shares” for investors and 
“voting shares” for members (see Ridley-Duff, 2002).  The Co-operative 
Group also established a multi-stakeholder governance model for its national 
programme of childcare centres that distributes control rights while protecting 
shared assets through common ownership8. 
All these models challenge prevailing views on who controls the enterprise 
and how surplus value should be distributed amongst stakeholders.  They 
also challenge the reliance in the Combined Code on ‘independent’ directors 
to make ‘rational’ judgements to protect shareholder interests and favour 
internalisation of conflicts and socio-economic thinking guided by corporate 
debate (Etzioni, 1988). 
The direction of change is clear.  Originally, rights were accorded to 
entrepreneurs and individual investors (“property owning democracy”).  This 
conception of democracy is still prevalent in the business community – that 
entrepreneurial and investor rights are the foundation of democracy.  
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However, alternative views became possible once joint-stock and risk sharing 
were allowed in Company Law.  This allowed the formation of elites who 
shared risk, and which may consult without giving up ownership or control 
rights (“elitist democracy”).  The formalisation of Co-operative Law (in other 
countries, but not yet in the UK) legitimises commercial trading activity where 
companies operate a one-member, one-vote system of control (“egalitarian 
democracy”).  Most recently, social entrepreneurs have adapted Company 
Law to create enterprises that allow direct democratic control of 
representatives speaking on behalf of different interest groups (“stakeholder 
democracy”). 
Each of these positions construct democratic legitimacy in a different way: 
Table 2 - Democratic Legitimacy in Business Practice 
 Unitarism 
Society is best served by 
creating consensus 
Pluralism 
Society is best served by 
encouraging diversity 
 
Individualism 
Entrepreneur-owned and 
controlled enterprise.  
Entrepreneur selects senior 
management. 
 
 
(Property-based 
Democracy) 
One-member / one-vote 
societies, associations, 
democratic businesses and 
cooperatives.  
Directors/Executive officers 
elected by membership. 
 
(Egalitarian Democracy) 
 
 
Communitarianism 
Board or Trustee controlled 
organisations dominated by 
one stakeholder group or 
self-selecting elite.  Senior 
managers are appointed by 
the elite. 
 
 
(Elitist Democracy) 
Multi-stakeholder ownership 
and recognition of interest 
groups.  Executive positions 
controlled by stakeholder 
groups and subject to 
executive and/or direct 
democratic control. 
 
(Stakeholder Democracy) 
In the next section, I examine how these discourses and constructions of 
democracy have influenced contemporary debate about the social enterprise 
movement. 
3. The Emergence of Social Enterprise 
Concepts of social enterprise oriented towards public sector policy (DTI 2002, 
2003; Haugh, 2005) differ from those with a more entrepreneurial orientation 
(see NEF/SAS, 2004; Allen, 2005).  The DTI definitions focus on social 
purpose and see no contradiction between this and the existing provisions of 
Company Law (see CIC regulations, 2005).  The emergence of social 
enterprise has been supported by the development of the Community Interest 
Company (CIC).  As at 9th May 2006, 240 companies had registered as a CIC 
and these include educational and health organisations, housing groups, 
theatre and media companies, consultancies, car sharing organisations, art 
groups, golf courses, farming consortia, shops and cafes, magazines, 
recycling and energy and transport organisations.9  The only fundamentally 
different requirement for a CIC – over and above a “normal” company – is that 
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the directors must convince the regulator that trading activities support a bona 
fide social venture, monitored through a short report each year.   
In some ways, the CIC company form introduced in July 2005 is even more 
unitarist than its private sector counterpart.  Companies can be limited by 
Guarantee or by Shares.  Either way, external investors cannot individually 
hold more than 25% of voting shares.  While this removes overall control from 
a single stakeholder, it transfers collective power to the board of directors.  
Stakeholder governance is not a requirement so directors are answerable (in 
law) only to the regulator unless specific constitutional provisions are made in 
the Memorandum and Articles.  In effect, a legal framework has been created 
in which the executive – by default at least – is unrestrained by either 
stakeholder democracy or shareholder democracy. 
Can this be considered a community interest company?  Intellectually, the 
CIC places faith in the integrity of social entrepreneurs to act in the public 
interest – a highly individualist assumption that “good” people can be found to 
act in the interests of wider society.  There are, however, problems with this 
assumption.  What constitutes the common good changes with the political 
wind and the aspirations of entrepreneurs (Ridley-Duff, 2005).  Social 
enterprises are deliberately political (in as much as they intend to have more 
than economic impacts) so entrepreneurs may find themselves at odds with 
the political thinking of public administrators (Wallace, 2005).   
The final provisions for CIC governance reflect the influence of public, 
charitable and philanthropic funders during consultation.  These marginalized 
the views of social entrepreneurs regarding democratic governance and 
surplus sharing models (DTI, 2003; Wallace, 2005)10.  Has the law been 
framed so that a government can control the execution of political policy 
through the activities of social enterprises?  Is this why the law makes 
substantive provision for directors’ accountability to the regulator but does not 
require them to be accountable to their own stakeholders?  Or is this an 
expression in the social enterprise sector of the dominant governance 
discourse, namely that control rights are reserved for the suppliers of capital 
and those who bring the enterprise into being (Davies, 2002)?  The provisions 
within the legislation that allow a regulator (without the need to go to court) to 
intervene into an “errant” social enterprise pave the way for political 
interference in the running of social enterprises.  
The Asset Lock  
For Haugh (2005:3) “social enterprises are prevented from distributing their 
profits to those who exercise control over them”.  Certainly, this appears to be 
the wish of the UK government through the statutory requirement for an 
“asset lock” if enterprises want to qualify as a CIC.  However, as Vanek 
(1977) illustrated through extensive study of the Yugoslav economy, asset 
locks discourage the inward investment necessary for long-term 
sustainability.  Executive managers (or the workforce in co-operatives) 
respond by changing the wage policy to extract surplus value in response to 
devaluation of their labour contribution (Major and Boby, 2000).  The lack of 
tradable equity can reduce the emotional commitment of investors and 
employees to the future of the business unless alternative surplus sharing 
arrangements are institutionalised (see Cornforth, 1988, 1995; Conyon and 
Freeman, 2001; Ridley-Duff, 2002). 
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For others, however, an asset lock is inconsistent with conceptions of social 
enterprise (Brown, 2004).  As Allen (2005:57) argues, a key characteristic of 
social enterprise is the way that “ownership structures based on participation 
by stakeholder groups” is also matched by arrangements where “profits are 
distributed …to stakeholders or used for the benefit of the community.”  Such 
approaches have been enduringly successful in many countries (see 
Oakeshott, 1990; Ridley-Duff, 2005). 
What constitutes a social enterprise, therefore, is plagued by the same 
unitarist/pluralist debate identified earlier.  Those who want to invest their 
money through a social entrepreneur and control the purposes for which it 
can be used adopt a unitarist view of governance.  From this perspective, 
employees and managers must be controlled and prevented from extracting 
surplus value.  However, for others the very purpose of a social enterprise is 
to create economic and social democracy through changed social 
relationships.  For these enterprises, corporate governance ensures that 
managers and employees are empowered to determine how trading 
surpluses can be distributed and reinvested (including to members as 
individuals). 
As Defourny argues (2004), social enterprises now embrace terrain 
previously occupied by co-operative and non-profit organisations, but also 
potentially supersede both by replacing the principle of hegemony of one 
stakeholder group over another by adding to the argument for a stakeholder 
perspective in both ownership and control (compare Vinten, 2001; Wieland, 
2005).  The temptation is to see social enterprise as a subset of the social 
economy, a small part of one economic sector that can deliver social policy 
objectives.  A more ambitious view, however, is that social enterprise can 
potentially integrate economic and social ways of thinking to produce a more 
effective business form (Etzioni, 1988; Harding, 2004; Ridley-Duff, 2005).   
Social enterprise, therefore, can be viewed as a philosophical departure from 
the past that will underpin a new way of doing business.  As such, its success 
may challenge the rationalist bureaucracies of both big-business and 
government.  The intellectual challenge of the social enterprise movement is 
how to extend individualist thinking beyond financial transactions, and the 
visionary entrepreneur, into the social fabric and interpersonal relationships 
within an organisation.  If successful, people will be able to exercise greater 
choice over the way they work (and what they produce) to deliver the 
communitarian outcomes that hierarchical organisation and unitarist forms of 
control have failed to deliver (see Gates, 1998). 
Summary 
In this paper, I have examined differences between individualist and 
communitarian views of social organisation to explore how corporate 
governance is affected by beliefs about social identity, consensus and 
diversity.  The prevailing discourse prioritises shareholder interests, and limits 
discussion to the relationships between shareholders, directors and senior 
managers.   
Viable alternatives exist, however.  Each viable alternative has its own logic 
rooted in a different philosophical tradition.  Firstly, there are views rooted in 
the concept of meritocracy whereby bureaucratic control of the organisation 
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operates through the active generation of consensus, rules and procedures.  
This finds expression in unitarist approaches to corporate governance that 
grant power to a managerial elite.  The argument outlined here, however, is 
that unitarist outlooks – while sometimes adopting democratic rhetoric and 
benefiting from short-term exercises in consultation – are still based on 
authoritarian presumptions that degrade effectiveness over the longer term.   
The new business form – the CIC - does not require by default that the 
directors give regard either to the wishes of funders (although influence may 
be brought to bear) or the wishes of employees and beneficiaries.  In short, a 
naïve (individualist) faith is placed in the “goodness” of social entrepreneurs 
to create ethical businesses that will promote the common good.  They are 
hierarchically controlled through the agency of the “good” regulator, rather 
than democratically controlled by their own stakeholders and retain a unitarist 
orientation. 
In contrast to this, I outlined communitarian arguments for pluralist forms of 
corporate governance as a proactive response to social issues.  The 
co-operative form of governance, originally established to entrench the power 
of one stakeholder group, is evolving into multi-stakeholder democracy – 
forms of governance that accommodate different interests and relationships 
to the enterprise.  These discourses are finding expression in ownership and 
control arrangements that enfranchise employees, customers and suppliers 
(including suppliers of capital) so that surplus sharing and democratic debate 
induce the emotional and financial commitment for sustainable “success”. 
The way we approach enterprise, and enterprise governance, is rooted in our 
most deeply held beliefs about people, the purpose and nature of social 
organisation, and our attitude towards the legitimacy of interventions to bring 
about social change.  In setting out this meta-theoretical framework, it is 
possible to see that both unitarists and pluralists tackle social exclusion in 
different ways: unitarists, by establishing organisations with a remit to tackle 
exclusion from participation in a market economy through planned 
interventions; pluralists, by instituting organisations that deliberately 
enfranchise excluded groups by bringing them into their governance 
framework so that they can participate not only in a market economy, but also 
in the deliberation processes that shape their future.  This second approach 
resonates with Etzioni’s “moral dimension” (Etzioni, 1988) through the 
promotion of a decision-making model that moves beyond the limitations of 
logical-empirical thinking and accepts the legitimacy of emotional-social 
thinking.  Future research into social enterprise governance can examine this 
perspective more closely. 
It is the conclusion of this paper, therefore, that the most enduring impacts 
are likely to come from organisations that tackle social exclusion on both 
fronts – embracing a trading purpose that addresses the perceived needs of 
socially excluded groups, and allowing participation by them in decision-
making and wealth creation processes.  This will promote solutions more 
closely matched to actual (rather than imagined) needs while encouraging 
sustainability.
                                               
1
  At the 2003 Social Enterprise Conference organised by Heriott-Watt 
University, Edinburgh, both Liam Black (Social Enterprise of the Year, 2003) 
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and Jonathan Bland (Director of the Social Enterprise Coalition) called for a 
“more than profit” mentality. 
2
  New Economics Foundation / Shorebank Advisory Services 
3
  Members of MCC co-operatives are self-employed. 
4
  Sheffield Community Enterprise Development Unit. 
5
  Bill Barker, October 2003.  We met to discuss the constitutional provisions 
and rationale of NewCo. 
6
  Geoff Cox, Social Firms UK, Submission to CIC consultation, July 2003 
7
  Industrial Common Ownership Movement 
8
  Mary Lockhart, Co-operative Group, 2003 Social Enterprise Conference, 
Herriot-Watt University, Edinburgh. 
9
  www.cicregulator.gov.uk/coSearch/companyList.shtml - accessed 11th May 
2006 
10
  The views of Social Firms UK (representing 300 enterprises), the Baxi 
Investment Trust and Sheffield Hallam University on the desirability of capital 
growth shares for entrepreneurs and employees in social enterprises were 
not acknowledged or reported in the final report on CICs (DTI, 2003).  Patrick 
Barry at the DTI, and representatives from the Home Office and Social 
Enterprise Unit, concurred that the strong lobbying by charitable trusts, public 
sector bodies and voluntary sector advocates had influence the 
recommendations regarding shareownership (meeting, February 2004). 
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